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NOTES
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND ECOLOGY
There is an insidious logic that implies that men must adapt
to machines, not machines to men; that production, speed,
novelty, progress at any price must come first, and people
second; that mechanization may be pushed as far as human
endurance will allow.
We have mastered the arts of animal husbandry, we know
the life laws of crops and insects, we know how to plan our
agricultural output. In effect, we have enhanced the future
of everything-except the overall future of the human race.
We have learned neither how to grow, nor at what pace,
and THAT is our failing and our future trouble.
The time has come for us to evolve an ecology of man in
harmony with the constantly unfolding ecologies of other liv-
ing things. We need a man-centered science which will seek
to determine the interrelationships of life.... Our goal should
be to accomplish both full production and the full life...
prosperity that will include prosperity of the human spirit
... we need to realize that: bigger is not better; slower may
be faster; less may well mean more.'
I. Introduction
Concern for the environment in the past decade has come to ex-
tend beyond the province of a few educators and private agencies
to become an object of national attention. New theories on its pres-
ervation arise daily. In this context, this note will examine the pres-
ent problem in North Dakota; will explore legislation in effect and
note its deficiencies; will examine common law remedies and note
1. S. UDALL, MAN, AN ENDANGERED SPECIES, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR CON-
SERVATIPON YEARBOOK No. 4, at 3 (1970).
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their deficiencies as well; and will suggest an alternative solution-
namely, the inclusion of a new environmental clause within the
North Dakota Constitution.
A. The Scope of the Problem
"There is, of course, pollution in the Red River here. There is
pollution in the Red River all the way from its source to the mouth
of the River in Canada."'2 This statement was made six years ago.8
Problems were recognized years ago. What has been the result?
The 1970 Report of the Souris-Red-Rainy River Basins Commission
notes: "Surface water quality in the Red River Basin is satisfactory
during normal years, despite an increasing degradation in the Red
River proper."4 The report continues, "Mainstream and Red River
water is not considered suitable at this time for recreational activity
involving water contact. ' 5
The Red River is not North Dakota's only pollution problem,
though it is the most blatant. The report of the Commission cited
above further notes: "The greatest problem in the Souris Basin is
the high chemical content, and water in this basin is marginal at
best. '" (emphasis added).
This report summarizes:
Each of the basins suffer to some extent from eutrophi-
cation of its lakes. Lake Metigoshe, in the Souris, is losing
recreation and wildlife values because of eutrophication. Seri-
ous eutrophication7 exists and many of the lakes in the area
have lost value as recreational sources.8
North Dakota's pollution problems are not limited to water. In
May: of 1969 the Grand Forks Herald reported that hundreds of song
birds were killed in Grand Forks due to the aerial spraying of mos-
quitoes.9 A similar event took place in Fargo, and considerable
property damage resulted.10 The growth of industry and tremendous
2. K. RoLVAAG, PROCEEDINGS CONFERENCE: IN THE MATTER OF POLLUTION OF THE IN-
TERSTATE WATERS OF THE RED RIVER OF THE NORTH 5 (1966).
3. PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE OF MINNESOTA, PROCEEDINGS CONFEENCE : NI THE MA TER
OF POLLUTION OF THE INTERSTATE WATERS OF THE RED RIVER OF THE NORTH 99 (1966):
Sewage and industrial wastes discharged into the Red River of the
North and the Red Lake River from Minnesota cause pollution in the
interstate waters of the Red River of the North which endangers the
health or welfare of persons in North Dakota ...
4. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SOurs-RED-ItINy RrVER BASINS COMMISSION 9 (1971).
5. Id. at 9.
6. Id. at 9.
7. "Eutrophication" is defined as the increase of mineral and organic nutrients which
reduces the dissolved oxygen in a body of water.
8. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SOURIS-RED-RAiNT RIVER BASINS COMMISSION 9 (1971).
9. Grand Forks Herald, May 26, 1969, at 1, col. 3.
10. The Fargo Forum, Aug. 1, 1969, at 1, col. 2.
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potential for industrialization in the state opens far more avenues
for the pollution of North Dakota's air.
Mr. H. R. Morgan, field representative for the National Wildlife
Federation, after witnessing the burning of crude oil in North
Dakota's oil fields noted: "After a few hours in this field, where I
witnessed accumulations of oil being burned from waste collection
pits with the resulting black clouds of smoke, I felt physically ill
and mentally depressed.""!
In addition, the problem of aerially applied economic poisons
arises. In 1968 North Dakota ranked first in the amount of herbicides
applied to 10,776,618 acres of cropland. 1 2 Most of these herbicides
are aerially applied. The effects are only now beginning to be real-
ized. 18
This summary only highlights air and water pollution problems
because they are most evident and because the most extensive studies
have been carried on in these areas.
14
Though causes are many and varied, the Director of the Division
of Water Supply and Pollution Control in the state suggests a major
source of concern in North Dakota:
There are some authorities in the field who state that
agricultural wastes are the biggest source of pollution in our
nation. Certainly the control of pollution from this source pre-
sents a highly complex problem to State water pollution con-
trol agencies because of the many factors involved and be-
cause the wastes are not at a point source entering the river
but from thousands of points. In addition, there are many
aspects of the problem of wastes from agriculture which are
very variable. There is still much research needed into the
problems of control of silt, of pesticides and herbicides in
runoff from agricultural areas, in the amounts of nitrates,
phosphates, and other nutrients in fertilizers being used which
may be carried off the fields, and this, too, would of course
be dependent upon the type of soil. As noted, feedlots are only
part of the problem but it is felt that there is enough knowl-
edge to begin working on this problem even though in this
field there are numerous questions which are still unans-
wered.1
5
Accepting the conclusion that pollution does exist in North
11. Morgan, Conservationists and Responsibiities for Their Environment, CONSERVA-
TION NEWS, Jan. 1, 1969, at 4.
12. Note, The Peril of Air Pollution in North Dakota, 46 N.D. L. REV. 217, 222 (1970).
13. Among the effects are the gradual extinction of some species and high incidence
of DDT-infected tissue in animals high in the food chain. A high incidence of DDT has
been found in mothers' milk.
14. Nor is this discussion of air and water pollution problems intended to be ex-
haustive.
15. Letter from Norman L. Peterson to authors, Sept. 1, 1971. (Hereinafter referred
to as letter from Peterson.)
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Dakota, that many of its causes are identifiable, and that the prob-
lem is becoming more serious all the time, it must be asked why this
is so. Is there legislation in North Dakota designed to protect the
environment? If so, is it effective? If not, why not? If it is not, can
it be made effective, or must we look to other solutions? Do other
sources of law exist which offer effective protection?
II. Existing Legislation and Its Enforcement-An Overview
A. Water Pollution
The North Dakota Century Code provisions authorizing the "con-
trol, prevention, and abatement of pollution of the surface waters of
the state" extend from section 61-28-01 through section 61-28-08. The
first inadequacy is apparent on the face of the provisions.
The title indicates that the provisions are applicable only to "sur-
face" waters of the state. Yet, section 61-28-02 (6) purports to cover
ground as well as surface water. Furthermore, both the State
Health Department and the State Water Commission have some role
relating to water pollution; yet these provisions prescribe a separate
water pollution control board as well. And if the problem is oil field
pollution, it appears to be within the jurisdiction of the Industrial
Commission .
16
Members of the State Water Pollution Control Board, who are
not already in the employ of state agencies, serve without compen-
sation. No matter how dedicated the individual, to serve without com-
pensation on such a Board could only strain the time and resources
of the average member. This is even more true when one considers
the composition of the Board. The ten members include the already
deluged heads of the departments of health, water conservation, and
game and fish, the state geologist, four citizen members represent-
ing municipal, industrial, wildlife and agricultural interests, and two
citizen members representing at-large interests.
17
Not only do some of the members serve without pay, thereby
placing little or no obligations upon any of them, but also, four of
the members are chosen to specifically represent special interests.
The problem with special interest group representation is that
representation by such interests is contrary to the purposes of such
a board. The interests of political subdivisions, usually municipalities,
are represented on the control boards. It would seem that munici-
16. Address by Robert E. Beck, Prof. of Law, University of North Dakota, at Annual
Meeting of Action Committee for Environmental Education, Bismarck, North Dakota,
Feb. 28, 1970. (Hereinafter referred to as Address by Prof. Beck.)
17. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-28-03 (Supp. 1971).
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palities, particularly cities, would have a stake in effective regulation.
However, it is municipalities which face financial crisis and upon
which the withdrawal of industry will have the greatest effect. Mu-
nicipalities may oppose effective regulation not only because they
fear competitive disadvantage in seeking industry, but also because
they themselves constitute a large class of polluters. 18
It could, however, be argued that representatives of the general
public, the heads of the various state departments, act as counter-
vailing forces to industry, municipalities and agriculture. 19 Since "con-
servation oriented" departments are designated by the Code, such
a conclusion does not appear altogether illogical at first glance. Vari-
ous weaknesses, however, are apparent here as well.
Though the departmental heads are designated as members, the
actual selection process goes beyond legislative designation-i.e., the
department head designated is also delegated the power of selection
since he may choose a member of his agency for the position and no
limitations are put upon such a selection.
20
Furthermore, even assuming that these representatives of the
general public are numerous enough and interested enough to pro-
vide a balancing influence, to whom does such a public represent-
ative look for support when confronted with other well organized
special interest groups? The general public? And, more importantly,
how does he measure the interest of the general public? Public in-
terest is neither identifiable nor predictable as a balancing of other
interests .
21
Another clear defect in water pollution legislation is a statute des-
ignating the priorities of water use.22 It reads:
In all cases where the use of water for different pur-




3) Irrigation and industry.
4) Fish, wildlife and other outdoor recreational uses.
23
When one considers the continuing eutrophication of lakes and other
18. Vaughn, State Air Pollution Control Board: The Interest Group Model and the
Lawyer's Role, 24 OKL. L. REv. 39 (1971).
19. Id. at 39.
20. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-28-03. (1960).
21. Vaughn, supra note 18, at 41.
22. N.D. CENT. CoDE § 61-01-01.1 (1960).
23. Id.
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recreational areas cited at the opening of this paper,2 4 the low pri-
ority of such areas appears misplaced. This is especially true when
one considers the fact that the above priorities are those established
for the entire state, not only the densely inhabited regions.
Also, as mentioned previously, 25 the North Dakota Water Con-
servation Commission has a role in water pollution control in that it
is the department responsibile for a system of water appropriation
in the state. However, the question arises as to whether the Com-
mission has sufficient police powers to supervise the system. 2
The State Health Department, too, has a role in the control of
water pollution. 27 However, it has been noted:
One of the problems facing this Department is lack of
personnel. We have only two full time people for both field
work and office work. In addition, we have one man whose
job it is to take care of the stream monitoring program. We
have thirty stations scattered throughout our state which
must be visited and samples taken on a monthly basis. As
a result, we must necessarily point our efforts toward solu-
tion of the more serious pollution problems and sometimes a
private individual's over-flowing septic tank may have to wait
until there is time to check into it. 28 (emphasis added).
B. Air Pollution
North Dakota has an Air Pollution Control Act.2 9 Its provisions
are subject to some of the same criticisms already levelled at the
Water Pollution Control legislation.
The Air Pollution Control Advisory Council is delegated the duty
of advising the State Health Department in matters pertaining to
environmental protection. Among special interest groups represented
on that Council are county or municipal government, the solid fuels
industry and the fluid and gas fuels industry. Three other members
are heads of state departments who have authority to delegate their
positions to others in their departments. The Council purportedly does
not have any enforcement powers. However, its "approval" is re-
quired before the Health Department may adopt, amend, or repeal
the rules and regulations implementing the Act.80
The Air Pollution Control Act, on its face, appears to provide
adequate authority to control most air pollution in the state. However,
24. See notes 5-8 supra.
25. See note 16 supra.
26. Address by Prof. Beck.
27. See note 16 aupra.
28. Letter from Peterson.




the laws themselves are useless without proper enforcement, and
the enforcement is seriously hampered:
The State Department of Health's budget for air pollu-
tion control in 1971 was $30,000. In 1972 it has risen to $65,-
000. In 1971 there were 2.75 professional people on the staff in
air pollution. Currently we have 3.05 professional people, our
engineer's position has yet to be filled. Our budget of $65,000
a year and our staff of 3.05 professional people is, in my
opinion, still inadequate to do a good job of air pollution
control in the State.
31
The statement above woefully understates the total inadequacy
of the budget and enforcement capabilities.
North Dakota has no laws controlling agriculturally related air
pollution such as windblown dust, airborn pesticides and herbicides
caused by poor spraying practices and dust from harvesting opera-
tions. The problem of insecticides, pesticides and herbicides is one
which requires more specific legislation than present law provides,
2
although they can be considered air contaminants as defined in chap-
ter 23-25 and regulated under this law. The problem of land use,
transportation control and motor vehicles are other areas that need
more specific legislation.33 Under section 23-25-01 (1) of the North
Dakota Code, an air contaminant is defined as ". . . dust, fumes,
mist, smoke, other particulate matter, vapor, gas, or a combination
thereof, not including water vapor, water mist, or steam condensate."
The difficulty of including economic poisons within this definition is
that none of the categories adequately describes the method of ap-
plication of such poisons.3 4 In addition, only in the 1971 Legislative
Session were herbicides even included within the definition of "eco-
nomic poisons"35 for purposes of regulation under the North Dakota
31. Letter from Dana K Mount, Division of Environmental Engineering, State De-
partment of Health, to authors, Sept. 7, 1971. (Hereinafter referred to as Letter from
Mount) The North Dakota State Department of Health will submit an implementation
*plan pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 110 (1971) for "implementation, maintenance, and enforce-
ment" of a national primary ambient air quality standard. If such a plan is acceptable
to the Air Pollution Control Office of the Environmental Protection Agency, North Da-
kota will gain additional federal funds. If approval is withheld, the federal government
will initiate its own state-wide plan.
32. Note, Pesticide Use and Liability in North Dakota, 47 N.D. L. V. 335 (1971).
33. Letter from Mount.
34. The most likely classification of herbicides et al, would appear to be "particulate
matter." Atmospheric particulate matter has been classified as smoke, dusts, mists, and
fumes with each reflecting the source or nature of the particulate. Further qualification
of this definition cited in the Hearings on Air Pollution Before the Subcommittee on Air
and Water Pollution of the Senate Committee on Public Works, 90th Cong., 2nd Sess., at
1043 (1968), states that, "Suspended particulate matter is generally considered to con-
sist of any or all of the particles mentioned previously, (smoke, dust, mists, and fumes)
when they are of such a size and density that they tend to remain suspended in the
atmosphere-i.e., settle slowly if at all." This definition appears to require a certain
quantity and duration before the particulate matter would be considered as air pollution.
Making such a determination through normal air sampling methods, however, may be
impossible.
35. N.D. CENT. CODE § 19-18-03 (Supp. 1971). See also Note, Pesticide Use and Lia.
bility in North -akota,- 47 N.D. L. Rzv. 835, 336 (1971).
31
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Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act. It has also been noted:
North Dakota has vast reserves of lignite coal in the
western half of the State and the potential growth in the
number of power plants burning lignite to make gas, oil, and
other chemicals would appear to be quite substantial in the
near future. It is hoped that the new Federal laws and
regulations and the State laws and regulations will be ade-
quate to control air pollution from these plants, but the sheer
number of these plants that is possible in the future may
present a serious air pollution problem even though the most
efficient control equipment that present technology can pro-
vide is applied to these plants.
6
North Dakota also has a weather modification statute which
limits to licensed personnel the right to attempt weather modification.
However, enforcement here is left to the Aeronautics Commission,
and the special interests represented within that Commission present
further problems.3 7 It was that Commission's lobbying in the main
which caused the 1971 Legislature to eliminate a provision from the
North Dakota Code allowing the judicial application of "strict lia-
bility" concepts to aerial sprayers.3s
C. Conclusion
The problem in North Dakota, therefore, is not a lack of law.
The problem is, rather, that the laws have numerous deficiencies,
especially as to enforcement capability. And enforcement deficien-
cies are directly related to a lack of dedication to the principals of
a clean environment.
III. THE TRADITIONAL LEGAL THEORIES-AN OVERVIEW
The usefulness of the traditional legal theories such as private
nuisance, public nuisance, trespass, negligence, and strict liability,
for controlling pollution in North Dakota is not clear. Case law in
36. Letter from Mount.
37. Note, Pesticide Use and Liability in North Dakota, 47 N.D. L. REv. 335, 347 (1971).
38. Address by Harold Vavra, Director North Dakota Aeronautics Commission, Annual
Aerial Sprayers Seminar, Devils Lake Junior College, May 1971.
In addition, in 1969, the North Dakota Legislature passed legislation requiring
that mine-owners reclaim strip-mined land. Such strip-miners are required to get a per-
mit, deposit $200 per acre bond, present a reclamation plan acceptable to the Public Serv-
ice Commission and implement that plan. The law, however, applies only when the over-
burden exceeds ten feet in depth and, more importantly, it does not appear that the Com-
mission may deny a permit to someone who has given them trouble before. N.D. CNr.
CODE ch. 38-14 (Supp. 1971).
Another statute requires that, if trees are cleared up to a river bank in flood
areas, trees must be planted back for at least 200 feet. whether this requirenent is
enforceable is questionable since no enforcement machinery has been set up. N.D. CENT.
CODE § 61-16-11(18) (Supp. 1971).
The 1971 Legislature also passed a noise pollution control statute so devoid of
enforcement capability as to be inconsequential. N.D. Cm T. Co s § 22-01-17 (Supp. 1971).
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these areas is often insufficiently developed to determine if they
would be helpful in controlling environmental degradation. There-
fore, this overview, will attempt to predict the utility of these legal
theories on the basis of general case law from other jurisdictions,
where North Dakota law is insufficient.
A. Private Nuisance
The law of private nuisance in North Dakota comes from essen-
tially two sources: statute39 and common law.40 The common law
of private nuisance prohibits the unreasonable use of property so as
to substantially interfere with the use and enjoyment of another's
property.41 At first glance, a private nuisance suit, possibly result-
ing in an injunction, would appear to be an effective means of con-
trolling pollution; however, further scrutiny shows that there are
formidable obstacles to any plaintiff's success.
For the plaintiff to recover, he must first prove that defendant's
use of his property has been unreasonable. The North Dakota Su-
preme Court states the requirement in this manner:
The ultimate question in each case involving an alleged
nuisance is whether the challenged use is reasonable in view
of all the surrounding circumstances.
42
The plaintiff must also show a substantial interference with his prop-
erty interests resulting from the defendant's use of his land, 43 the
state of mind of the defendant being irrelevant. 44 This requirement
presents two obstacles to the plaintiff. First, he must show a sub-
stantial interference with the enjoyment of his land, which is dif-
ferent from that suffered by the public generally.45 Second, he must
show that the substantial interference was caused primarily by the
defendant. Thus, even though substantial pollution exists, such as
water pollution that kills fish in the rivers or air pollution that kills
birds or wildlife,46 a private individual cannot bring the action be-
cause he cannot show some special injury, different in kind and de-
gree from that suffered by the public generally. 7 Further, the sec-
39. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 42-01-01, 02, 03 (1960).
40. The case law does not indicate the potential limits of the law of private nuisance
clearly. However, many cases would seem to be good starting points for the development
of private nuisance as a legal tool for controlling pollution.
41. See generally Porter, The Role of Private Nuisance Law in the Control of Air
Pollution, 10 ARiZ. L. REV. 107 (1968).
42. Ingmundson v. Midland Continental R.R., 42 N.D. 455, 173 N.W. 752 (1919).
43. Town of Colton v. South Dakota Cent. Land Co., 25 S.D. 309, 126 N.W. 507 (1910).
44. Thorson v. City of Minot, 153 N.W.2d 764 (N.D. 1967).
45. Pace v. American Radiator and Standard Sanitary Corp., 346 F.2d 321, 323 (7th
Cir. 1965).
46. Columbia River Fishermen's Protective Union v. City of St. Helens, 87 P.2d 195
(Ore. 1939); Goldsmith & Powell v. State, 159 S.W.2d 534 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942).
47. Pace v. American Radiator and Standard Sanitary Corp., 346 P.2d 321, 323 (7th
Cir. 1965).
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ond requirement of showing a causal connection between defendant's
activities and the alleged interference can prevent recovery in cases
where a large number of polluters contribute to the fouled air or
water, making it impossible to determine the individual responsibil-
ities.
The final and most important obstacle to a plaintiff's using pri-
vate nuisance as an effective tool for controlling pollution is the dif-
ficulty encountered in securing an equitable injunction as opposed to
money damages. Traditionally, the courts have been reluctant to
grant injunctive relief because they felt that the remedy is harsh and
one not to be employed unless the facts undeniably demand it. This
reluctance is exemplified by the application by the courts of the
doctrine of comparative injury in dealing with a suit for an injunc-
tion.48
Today, nuisance appears to be of diminishing significance in con-
trolling pollution since the problems described above cause litigation
directed against large industrial and municipal complexes to be pro-
hibitively expensive, thereby forcing many potential plaintiffs to sub-
mit to a polluted environment rather than bear the high cost of lit-
igation.49
B. Public Nuisance
The North Dakota Century Code defines a public nuisance as
"one which at the same time affects an entire community or neigh-
borhood or any considerable number of persons. . . ."5o and limits the
remedies for such a nuisance to action by the state unless the pri-
vate individual can show a special injury.51 Because of its wide dif-
fusion, pollution affects many people in an equal degree.5 2 There-
fore, the usefulness of public nuisance as a device for controlling
pollution would seem to greatly depend upon the questionable effec-
tiveness of the state enforcement officials who are hindered by such
problems as political pressure and inadequate budgets.53 In addition,
public nuisance has been historically associated with abatement of
brothels, gambling dens, and similar institutions, and the case law
48. Note, Environmental Law: The Price of Pollution, 39 U.M.K.C. L. REV. 200, 203
(1970) ; The court in Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 55 Misc. 2d 1023, 287 N.Y.S.2d 112
(1967), while not expressly saying so, in fact applied the comparative injury doctrine.
This doctrine requires the court, in a suit for an injunction, to balance the loss to the
plaintiffs if the nuisance is continued against the loss to the defendants and the public
if it is enjoined.
49. This survey of the difficulties encountered in using the private nuisance action to
control pollution is not comprehensive. Other obstacles exist such as the docatrine of
"coming to the nuisance", "balancing of equities", "laches", and "assumption of risk".
50. N.D. CENT. CODE § 42-01-06 (1960).
51. N.D. CENT. CODE § 42-01-08 (1960); If special injuries can be shown the plaintiff
would in effect be pursuing a private nuisance action and be confronted with the prob-
lems discussed in the section dealing with private nuisance.
52. Juergensmeyer, Control of Air Pollution Through the Assertion of Private Rights,
1967 DUKE L. J. 1126, 1135.
53. Reitze, Pollution Control: Why Has It Failed, 55 A.B.A.J. 923 (1969).
is not easily transferable to problems of the physical environment.5'
Thus, public nuisance, like private nuisance, would at best be of
questionable utility to the environmentalist.
C. Trespass
A trespass is defined as an actionable invasion of interests in the
exclusive possession of land.5 5 To establish trespass, one need only
show an intentional, unprivileged entry onto the land.56 This require-
ment of proof has traditionally been a difficult one in an anti-pol-
lution lawsuit because it was necessary to show a direct physical
entry by an "object," which was defined by some courts as a thing
more substantial than a particle of smoke or dust. In addition, if
an intervening force, such as wind or water, carried the contami-
nating objects onto the plaintiff's land, some courts held that the
entry was not "direct" enough to constitute a trespass.5 7 However,
in a landmark decision, the Supreme Court of Oregon held the Rey-
nolds Metal Company liable in trespass when flouride compounds in
the insubstantial form of gases and particulates drifted from its plant
chimney and settled on plaintiff's land.58
In upholding the lower court's award to the plaintiff, the court
discussed and dismissed the former impediment to recovery in tres-
pass for pollution by stating:
The view recognizing a trespassory invasion where there
is no 'thing' which can be seen with the naked eye undoubt-
edly runs counter to the definition of trespass expressed in
some quarters. It is quite possible that in an earlier day when
science had not yet peered into the molecular and atomic
world of small particles, the courts could not fit an invasion
through unseen physical instrumentalities into the require-
ment that a trespass can result only from a direct invasion.
But in this atomic age even the uneducated know the great
and awful force contained in the atom and what it can do
to a man's property if it is released. In fact, the now famous
equation E=mc 2 has taught us that mass and energy are
equivalents and that our concept of 'things' must be re-
framed. . . . Viewed in this way we may define trespass as
any intrusion which invades the possessor's protected interest
in exclusive possession, whether that intrusion is by visible or
invisible pieces of matter or by energy which can be meas-
ured only by the mathematical language of the physicist.59
54. Note, Environmental Law: New Legal Concepts in the Antipollution Fight, 36 Mo.
L. REv. 78, 84 (1971).
55. Note, The Environmental Lawsuit: Traditional Doctrines and Evolving Theories
to Control Pollution, 16 WAYNE L. REv. 10,85, 1115 (1970).
56. Note, Environmental Law: New Legal Concepts ti the Antipollution Fight, 36 Mo.
I. REv. 78, 84 (1971).
57. Id. at 85.
58. Martin v. Reynolds Metal Co., 342 P.2d 790 (Ore. 1959).
59. Id. at 793-94.
NOTES 317
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While this case would seem to foretell wider use of trespass as a
legal weapon against polluters, there remain some major obstacles
to such use.
Greatest of these obstacles is the defense of prescriptive rights,
whereby, if the trespass has occurred over a long period of time,
the polluter-trespasser may have acquired a prescriptive right to
continue his activity.10 In addition, the difficulty of pin-pointing the
source of the pollution which caused the injury to the plaintiff, the
courts' tendency to balance the equities, and the cost of litigating
against large economic interests discourage prolific use of trespass.6 1
D. Negligence
Negligence is the failure of a person to observe, for the protec-
tion of another's interests, that degree of care, precaution, and vigi-
lance justly demanded by the circumstances, by reason of which
failure such other person suffers injury.62 This definition would seem
to make recovery from the defendant conditional upon two elements:
a showing that defendant was negligent and showing of a causal re-
lationship between his negligence and the plaintiff's injury.63 How-
ever, difficulty would be encountered by the environmental litigant
in trying to show that defendant was negligent because there is cur-
rently no widely recognized "standard of care" against which the
conduct of the alleged polluter may be measured."
In North Dakota, a violation of a statutory duty is evidence of
negligence although not negligence as a matter of law.6 5 Therefore,
the statutory duties imposed by North Dakota's pollution control laws
would seem to, at the very least, shed some light on the applicable
standard of care in North Datota. 6 However, in the absence of an
express statement by the legislature concerning the extent to which
the pollution legislation affects the standard of care applicable in
common law negligence actions, the courts will probably fashion some
other more accommodating standard. One commentator has outlined
such a standard like this:
The standard to which the courts will hold the producer
of pollutants depends in final analysis upon the view the judge
60. Juergensmeyer, Control of Air Pollution Through the Assertion of Private Rights,
1967 DUKE L. J. 1126, 1142.
61. Note, Environmental Law: Z'ew Legal Concepts in the Antipollution Fight, 36 Mo.
L. REV. 78, 85 (1971).
62. Zerr v. Sommer, 179 N.W.2d 330 (N.D. 1970).
63. Clark v. Payne, 48 N.D. 911, 187 N.W. 817 (1922).
64. Note, The Environmental Lawsuit: Traditional Doctrines and Evolving Theories to
Control Pollution, 16 WAYN"E L. REv. 1085, 1121 (1970).
65. Steel v. Downs, 438 F.2d 310 (8th Cir. 1971).
66. The statutory duties imposed by the North Dakota Water Pollution Control Act
and the North Dakota Air Pollution Control Act would be a good starting point for
formulating the standard of care applicable to negligence cases involving pollution.
and jury take of the social utility of pollution control, which
is in turn a product of how serious a danger to our society
they consider air pollution. The standard no doubt will be
seriously affected not only by the state of scientific knowl-
edge as to the causes and effects of air pollution, but also
by the state of technology and the extent to which present
pollution control devices are effective and economically
feasible.
6 7
Finally, the environmental litigant will be confronted with the
persistent problem of proving causation where the sources of pol-
lution are numerous.
E.' Strict Liability
The principle of strict liability allows for recovery against a
defendant even though no fault can be attributed to him. Generally
speaking, the actions of nuisance6s and trespass9 encompass the
concept of strict liability since each allows a recovery where no fault
on the part of the defendant has been shown. However, individuals
may suffer damage from pollutants in circumstances falling neither
into the category of nuisance or trespass. In such cases, it may be
necessary for the complainant to urge principles of strict liability
which are separate from the actions of nuisance and trespass.
Courts have recognized three theories of strict liability which
may be helpful to a plaintiff. (1) The English Rule of Rylands v.
Fletcher, (2) the doctrine of absolute nuisance and (3) the position
taken by the Restatement of Torts.7 0 The Rule of Rylands v. Fletch-
er was expressed by the Supreme Court of Montana, quoting Lord
Blackburn, as follows:
We think that the true rule of law is, that the person who,
for his own purposes brings on his land and collects and
keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes must
keep it in at his peril, and if he chooses not to do so, is
prima facie answerable for all the damage which is a nat-
ural consequence of its escape.7 1 (emphasis added).
The doctrine of absolute nuisance dictates liability where there
would ordinarily be none under the more common theory of nuisance
67. Juergensmeyer, Control of Air Pollution Through the Assertivn of Private Rights,
1967 DUKE L. J. 1126, 1147.
68. Thorson v. City of Minot, 158 N.W.2d 764 (N.D. 1967); The court stated: "One
need not prove negligence to establish that a nuisance has been maintained."
69. Slattery v. Rhud, 23 N.D. 274, 136 N.W. 237, 239 (1912). The court stated: "If
defendant . . . unlawfully trespassed on plaintiff's lot . . . , it is an elementary rule of
law that he must respond in damages . . . even though he . . . acted with care In so
doing."
70. Waschak v. Moffat, 879 Pa. 441, 109 A.2d 310, 318 (1954).
71. Dulton v. Rocky Mountain Phosphates, 151 Mont. 54, 438 P.2d 674, 680 (1968).
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(i.e. defendant is acting reasonably in all respects).72 In such cases
the courts entertain the notion that in certain cases, certain property
rights are fixed and invariable and the competing interests will not
be weighed in reaching a verdict.7 3 These nuisances may be of three
types. First are those defined by statute.7 4 These declarations of the
legislature are conclusive of what constitutes actionable nuisance and
will preclude any inquiry into the reasonableness of defendant's con-
duct.7 5 Second are those activities which are carried on with full
knowledge of the substantial certainty of harm to follow. 7 6 Finally,
ultrahazardous activities are nuisances despite the lack of negli-
gence.
77
The position taken by the Restatement of Torts' 8 is presented as
follows:
The actor is liable in an action for damages for a non-
trespassory invasion of another's interest in the private use
and enjoyment of land if,
(a) the other has property rights and privileges in respect
to the use or enjoyment interfered with; and
(b) the invasion is substantial; and
(c) the actor's conduct is a legal cause of the invasion; and
(d) the invasion is either
(i) intentional and unreasonable; or
(ii) unintentional and otherwise actionable under the
rules governing liability for negligent, reckless or ultra-.
hazardous conduct.79
While the Restatement has not been widely adopted, some courts




In addition to the common law actions, an injured party may
have available a constitutional action which would be useful in con-
72. Note, The Env'ironmental Lawsuit: Traditional Doctrines and Evolving Theories to
Control Pollution, 16 WAYNE L. Rsv. 1085, 1119 (1970).
78. Id.
74L The North Dakota Century Code defines such statutory nuisances in N.D. CENT.
CODE § 42-01-02 (1960).
75. Note, The Environmental Lawsuit: Traditional Doctrines and Evolving Theories to
Control Pollution, 16 WAYNE L. Rxv. 1085, 1119 (1970).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 822 (1939).
79. Id.
80. Washak v. Moffat, 379 Pa, 441, 109 A.2d 310 (1954); Evans v. Moffat, 192 Pa.
Super 204, 160 A.2d 465 (1960).
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trolling pollution.8' The initial substantive obstacle to the success-
ful assertion of a constitutional right to an environment free of sub-
stantial and unnecessary degradation is a finding that such a right
exists in, and is protected by the United States Constitution.8 2 The
next and possibly greatest obstacle where the defendant-polluter is
a private party is the state action requirement. 83 Although the mini-
mal limits to the state action requirements are unclear, it would ap-
pear that the state must be almost directly involved in the alleged
offending conduct. To this extent Judge Murray in Environmental
Defense Fund, Inc., v. Hoerner-Waldorf, Inc.,8 4 stated:
The activities of State Planning Boards and City Com-
missions may well constitute state actions, but to support a
Ninth or Fourteenth Amendment suit, the action of the state
must be . . . the proximate cause of the unconstitutional
action ... .85
In summary, it would appear that, at present, the suit by an
environmentalist asserting a federal constitutional right to a clean
environment will be unsuccessful. However, as the concern for the
environment increases, the existence of constitutional environmental
rights may be recognized, thereby eliminating the first obstacle to
a successful constitutional lawsuit. In addition, finding state action
to be involved in the degradation will become less difficult with the
enactment of stringent state environmental legislation which places
a duty upon the state to prevent environmental degradation. Thus
it would appear that the prospects for future success are not in-
significant.
H. Conclusion
Taken together, common law remedies are subject to the same
criticisms leveled at statutory remedies. Both exist-and exist ex-
tensively-but their utility in handling environmental problems is
limited. It would appear, therefore, that, rather than continue to en-
act more unsuitable remedies, the need exists to embark upon a new
path.
81. Such an action was unsuccessfully pursued in Environmental Defense Fund, Inc.
v. Hoerner-Waldorf Corp., No. 1694 (D. Mont. Aug. 25, 1970).
82. That such a right exists was recognized, in dictum, in Environmental Defense
Fund, Inc. v. Hoerner-Waldorf Corp., No. 1694 (D. Mont. Aug. 25, 1970). Judge Murray
did not recognize broad rights, but did recognize a right to health implicit in the fifth
and fourteenth amendments Due Process Clause; the ninth amendment which states "The
enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights shall not be construed to deny or dis-
parage others retained by the people" might also be a source of environmental rights.
U.S. OONST. amend. IX.
83. Note, Toward A Contitutionafly Protected Environment, 56 VA. L. REv. 458, 474
(1970).
84. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Hoerner-Waldorf Corp., No. 1694 (D. Mont.
Aug. 25, 1970).
85. Id.
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IV. THE INDISPENSIBLE SUPPLEMENT TO NORTH DAKOTA'S
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
Since the inadequacy of the existing legal framework for con-
trolling pollution is apparent, it becomes the responsibility of the en-
vironmentalist to propose other more effective and supplemental al-
ternatives. These alternatives may take at least three forms: (1) ex-
panded common law actions which present fewer obstacles to the
successful pursuit of the environmental lawsuit; (2) improved statu-
tory controls administered by state agencies and/or a statutory right
of action to be used by private individuals in lawsuits against pri-
vate and/or public polluters; and (3) constitutional provisions com-
manding state action to control pollution and/or a constitutional right
of action to be used by private individuals in lawsuits against pri-
vate and/or public polluters.8 6 To determine which of the three al-
ternatives is most suitable for dealing with North Dakota's present
and future pollution problems, each must be examined individually.
The probability of the courts creating expanded common law
actions which present only reasonable obstacles to the victims of pol-
lution in North Dakota is minimal at best. In light of past experience,
it would seem reasonable to say that any rapid and timely expan-
sion of the common law actions to meet the needs of our environment
will not occur. 7 Therefore, the first alternative is probably non-ex-
istent for North Dakotans.
The propriety of using statutory law to control pollution is not
questioned. Virtually every state in the United States has enacted
legislation of one form or another to control pollution. 88 However, it
appears equally unquestionable that the legislative approach is not
comprehensive enough, in and of itself, to bear the complete respon-
sibility for controlling pollution.89 Most often legislative responses to
perceived problems are too particular and hence short-lived.9 0 Fur-
thermore, what is enacted by statute can be changed by statute;
such a change taking the form of a bill authorizing action "notwith-
standing any other provision of the law." 91 In addition to the ease
with which statutory protections can be evaded, there is another
problem inherent in continuing to attack the problem solely through
legislation. Widely publicized, but under-funded, new legislation gives
86. Note, The Envftonmental Lawsuit: Traditional Doctrines and Evolving Theories to
Control Pollution, 16 WAYNE L. REv. 1085, 1131-34 (1970).
87. Cann, Institutionalization on the North Dakota Supreme Court (unpublished ar-
ticle on file at the office of the North Dakota Law Review).
88. See generally THE BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, ENVIRONMENT REPORTER.
89. Platt, Toward Constitutional Recognition of the Environment, 56 A.B.A.J. 1061
(1970).
90. Id.
91. Ottinger, Legislation and the Environment: Individual Rights and Government Ac-
countability, 55 CORNZEL L. REV, Q6q, 671 (1970).
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the appearance of action without the substance. "It lulls the public
into a false confidence that something is being done.
' 9 2
It is clear that the statutory alternative alone is not one which
will lead citizens to the enjoyment of an environment free from pol-
lutants. Rather, it would appear that it will be necessary for North
Dakotans to look for the only remaining realistic alternative for as-
sistance in fighting the war against pollution. That alternative is
the constitution.
A rational approach to an effective constitutional provision for
dealing with environmental problems requires that a search be made
to determine what form such a provision should take to be effec-
tive, and yet acceptable to the voters of North Dakota. In particular,
it must be decided whether the provision will be "benign" or "active,"
"a mere precatory statement" or an assertion of new priorities.9'
The former would be politically acceptable to everyone, yet it would
accomplish little to effectively retard environmental deterioration.
An "active" or "operative" provision would be more controversial,
but it would offer greater hope of stopping intolerable pollution. 4
Since the active provision will be more helpful than the benign
provision, it is then necessary to determine in more detail what form
the active provision should take. Several essentially active provisions
have been proposed or enacted on the state level" and several have
been proposed at the federal level. 6 Some of these proposals have
simply commanded governmental action compatible with the state
policy of preservation of the environment,' 7 while others have con-
tained an additional legal aspect, a private constitutional right of
action to be used by private individuals in lawsuits against public
and/or private polluters. 8
Virginia's article is representative of the provisions which have
simply commanded governmental action to preserve the environ-
ment. 9 Article XI of the Virginia Constitution declares the policy of
the Commonwealth to be to protect its atmosphere, lands, and waters
from pollution, impairment, or destruction, and further states that
92. Id.; In light of the insufficient funding of the pollution control legislation in
North Dakota it would seem that North Dakotans may have been lulled "into a false
confidence that something is being done."
93. Platt, Toward Constitutional Recognition of the Environment, 56 A.D.A.J. 1061
(1970).
94. Id.
95. Proposals have been offered in North Carolina, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and
Idaho. Provisions have been enacted in New York, Illinois, Rhode Island and Virginia.
96. H.R.J. Res. 1321, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968); S.S. Res. 169, 91st Cong., 2d Sess.
(1970); H.R.J. Res. 54, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969) ; H.R.J. Res. 505, 91st Cong., 1st
Sess. (1969); H.R.J. Res. 1205, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970); H.R.J. Res. 1294, 91st Cong.,
2d Sess. (1970); S.J. Res. 14, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); H.R.J. Res. 522, 92d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1971).
97 VA. CONST. art. XI, §§ 1, 2; R.I. CONST. art. 1, § 17.
98. N.Y. CONST. art XIV, §§ 4, 5; ILL. CONST. art. XI, §§ 1, 2.
99. VA. CONOT. art. XI, §§ 1, 2.
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the legislature may undertake the conservation, development, or util-
ization of natural resources in furtherance of such policy.100
Illinois' constitutional provision concerning the environment is a
comprehensive representation of those provisions which contain both
the command for state action and the private environmental right.1'0
Article XI of the Illinois Constitution declares that "the public policy
of the state and the duty of each person is to provide and maintain
a healthful environment for the benefit" of the people. 0 2 (emphasis
added). In addition, it further commands the legislature to imple-
ment the public policy through appropriate legislation and creates
in each person an actionable right to a healthful environment which
may be enforced "against any party, governmental or private,
through appropriate legal proceedings subject to reasonable limita-
tion and regulation" by the legislature.10 3
While the Virginia provision appears to leave the future of the
environment up to the legislature and thus the democratically elect-
ed majority, the Illinois provision checks the legislature's discretion
which may or may not be- vigorously utilized in protecting the en-
vironment by giving reasonable power to the minority to prevent
action of the majority which is in derogation of the minority's fun-
damental right to a healthful environment. By so doing, Illinois has
boldly and explicitly placed the right to a healthful environment on
a plane with other more familiar inalienable rights such as the right
to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness; rights which are not
subject to the whims of the majority. Illinois has recognized that,
today, the threats "to our environment and to our survival are as
real as were the dangers to free speech and free assembly" to the
United States Constitutional Convention of 1783.104
To blindly praise the Illinois constitutional provision and urge en-
actment of something very similar in North Dakota without further
search for the shortcomings of the provision would be unwise. 0 5
The aspect of the provision which simply commands the legislature
to enact legislation to control pollution would, in light of the state-
ments of environmentalists and their opposition, be acceptable to
both sides. 08 However, there are objections to a provision allowing
100. Id.
101. ILL. CONST. art. XI, §§ 1, 2. Creation of a statutory duty could establish a stand-
ard of care for purposes of a negligence suit.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Ottinger, Legislation and the Environment: individual Rfghts and Government
Accountability, 55 CORNELL L. REv. 666, 672 (1970).
105. The authors feel that the provision should not protect the environment at the cost
of economic bankruptcy.
106. Acquiesance by the environmentalists In the legislative approach is self evident.
In addition, the opposition's acquiesance is evident from a statement of the Michigan
Manufacturers Association which recommends legislative-administrative action to control




private individuals to maintain suits against other private individ-
uals to vindicate their right to a healthful environment. One such
objection states that the unbridled assault upon industry and other
polluters would result in driving industry from the state with such
a provision in its constitution into one with a less rigorous environ-
mental policy. 10 7 In fact, this objection to an unlimited private right
is a very legitimate one. However, the Illinois provision does not
provide an unlimited right. The Illinois provision provides for a right
to sue "subject to reasonable limitation and regulation" by the leg-
islature.110 (emphasis added). By subjecting the private right to rea-
sonable limitation by the legislature, the constitution has struck a
particularly timely and appropriate balance between the diverse po-
litical and economic interests of the majority and the environmental
interests of the minority.109 Such a balance, insures a more com-
promising and therefore successful approach to the prevention of en-
vironmental degradation.
V. CONCLUSION
That North Dakota has pollution problems is undeniable. Evi-
dence of it exists throughout the state and threatens to increase rather
than lessen. A survey of common law and statutory remedies has
demonstrated that they are inadequate on their face, in their en-
forcement, and because they are simply inflexible and therefore in-
applicable to the specific problems presented by pollution.
The incorporation of the recommended constitutional provisions,
therefore, would accomplish several ends. It would demonstrate an
active dedication by the people of the State to an abatement of pol-
lution. It would facilitate enforcement through the inclusion of the
private sector as plaintiffs in anti-pollution actions; and it would also
insure that such litigants could not transcend legitimate bounds pre-
scribed by legislative mandate.
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107. Roberts, The Right to a Decent Environment: EMC2: Environment Equal& Man
Times Courts Redoubling Their Efforts, 55 CORNELL L. Rzv. 674, 687 (1970).
108. ILL. CONST. art. XI, § 2. A reading of article XI in conjunction with § 1(d) of
the Transition Schedule indicates thal legislative action to limit the private right of
action is not a condition precedent to the creation and use of the private right, i.e. the
provision providing for the private right of action Is self executing. Thus, the legislature
is prevented from indefinitely delaying use of the private right by failure to provide for
reasonable limitations.
109. The word minority is not completely appropriate since the prevention of environ-
mental degradation Is in everyone's best Interest.

